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RECENT DECISIONS
CHARITABLE USES-CY PREs - DOCTRINE APPLIED TO DELETE RESTRIC-
TIVE TERMS "PROTESTANT," "GENTILE" FROM BEQUEST TO NON-SECTARIAN COL-
LEGE- Decedent made a testamentary bequest of $50,000 and the residue of his
estate to Amherst College. The fund was to be held in trust as a scholarship loan
fund for "deserving American born, Protestant, Gentile, boys of good moral repute."
Amherst College, a non-sectarian college, adopted a resolution refusing the bequest
if the fund must be used only in accordance with the religious restriction of the words
"Protestant!' and "Gentile." Executor, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for construction
of certain paragraphs of the will and for instructions directing administration of the
estate. Amherst College sought adjudication to apply the cy pres doctrine to accept
the fund without the religious restrictions. Testator's heirs claimed a failure of the
fund with the result that the plaintiff's testator died intestate. The Superior Court
held: By the application of the doctrine of cy pres the words "Protestant" and
"Gentile" were deleted from the will and the executor ordered to turn over to
Amherst College the fund to operate in compliance with all other conditions of
the will. Howard Savings Inst. v. Amherst College, 66 N.J. Sup. 119, 160 A.2d
177 (1960).
A frequently used definition of the cy pres power is that formulated in the
Restatement of Trusts:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impractical or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention
to devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but
the court will direct the application of the property to some charitable pur-
pose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.'
This doctrine is generally accepted in the United States, either judicially or
by statutory enactment.2 Five states have, however, expressly rejected the doctrine 3
Fear of arbitrary power or recurrence of decisions which clearly defeat or are con-
trary to the testator's intent 4 have made these courts wary of accepting or sanction-
ing the use of this doctrine; 5 but the trend has been toward acceptance.e
The limits of the doctrine are ill-defined and its application to charitable
trusts has not been accomplished without some difficulty. The generally recognized
requirements for application are: (1) a valid charitable trust; (2) that it be
impossible or impractical to carry out the specific intention of the testator; (3) that
the testator have a general charitable intention.7 Since the cy pres doctrine orig-
inated in equity, however, these requirements are not followed rigidly. Courts,
when recognizing a charitable purpose, will imply a trust even if the testator did
not specifically set up one." The courts have been equally liberal in applying cy
1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 399 (1935).
2 See FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES 92-112 (1950).
3 In re Hayward's Estate, 65 Ariz. 228, 178 P.2d 547 (1947); Henshaw v. Flenniken, 183
Tenn. 232, 191 S.W.2d 541 (1946); National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167 Miss. 571, 148
So. 649 (1933); Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S.C. 455, 77 S.E. 131 (1913); McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev.
Eq. 276 (N.C. 1828).
4 DaCosta v. De Pas, Amb. 228, 27 Eng. Rep. 631 (Ch. 1754); R. v. Lady Portington,
1 Salk. 163, 91 Eng. Rep. 151 (K.B. 1693).
5 FISCH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 991.
6 Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L. REv. 375, 388
(1952); Fisch, judicial Attitude Toward the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 25 TEMP.
L.Q. 177 (1951).
7 FISCH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 128.
8 In re Waller's Estate, 150 Misc. 521 269 N.Y. Supp. 402 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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pres to difficulties which make administration of a charitable trust impossible or
impractical. 9
The greatest amount of inconsistency and confusion has arisen from the dis-
parate results reached by courts attempting to interpret the requirement that the
testator have a general charitable intent. Considerable ingenuity has been exercised
in finding a general charitable intent in a specific grant. In Wilber v. Owens,'0
relied on in the present case, the testator bequeathed to Princeton University his ran-
dom notes and a fund to finance further research on his unfinished manuscript,
the completed product to be published. When the trust, being conditioned on
publication of the notes, was refused by the trustee, the court found that the testator
had a more general intent. Words used by the testator expressing a desire to benefit
mankind were interpreted by the court to be an expression of a more general sec-
ondary intent by. the testator.
In another New Jersey case," the bequest was made "for the Glory of God
and support of All Saints Church." This was found to be impossible to ad-
minister because the named church had relocated. The court then allowed the
fund to be applied to a nearby church of a different denomination. A general
charitable intent was imputed to the testator because of her use of the words "for
the Glory of God," even though her bequest was to a specific institution. Judi-
cial reasoning of this character has been criticized by some writers as a resort
to fiction' 2 - i.e., the courts impute to the testator a latent secondary intent when
in fact the testator has no secondary intent, not having considered the possibility
that the trust would fail.
In applying the three commonly recognized requirements in the Amherst case
the court found little difficulty in establishing the creation of a valid charitable
trust. It is commonly recognized in New Jersey that gifts for the furtherance of
education are for a charitable purpose; 13 such bequests generally do not lose their
charitable character because of the motive of the settlor"I The objection that the
bequest must necessarily fail because contrary to New Jersey's Anti-Discrimination
Statute,' 5 or to public policy, was dismissed because the private character of Amherst
College put it under a specific exclusion in the statute.'6
The court in Amherst did not bestir itself to discuss the possibility of adminis-
tering the fund with a substitute trustee in accordance with the exact language of
the deceased. The impossibility of administering the fund as the testator directed
arose because of the refusal of Amherst College to accept it under the explicit con-
ditions that it contained. The usual application of the doctrine of cy pres when
the trustee refuses the grant, and when a more general intention is indicated by
the testator, is to appoint a substitute trustee to apply the fund to a similar char-
9 Ramsey v. City of Brookfield, 361 Mo. 857, 237 S.W.2d 143 (1951) (funds insufficient
for end desired); Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843 (1949) (charity to publish notes
which were irrational); Morristown Trust Co. v. Protestant Episcopal Church of Diocese of
Florida, 1 N.J. Super. 418, 61 A.2d 762 (1948) (charity moved to another location); St. Louis
v. McAllister, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S.W.2d 677 (1932) (diminishing number of beneficiaries).
But see Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d 491 (1960); Lutheran Hospital of Man-
hattan v. Goldstein, 182 Misc. 913, 46 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1944) ; President and Fellows of Harvard
College v. Jewett, 11 F.2d 119 (1925).
10 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843 (1949).
11 Morristown Trust Co. v. Protestant Episcopal Church of Diocese of Florida, 1 N.J.
Super. 418, 61 A.2d 762 (1948).
12 2A BOGART, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 343 (1953); Note, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 323 (1939):
In deciding whether a particular gift manifests a general charitable intent and whether it
becomes impossible or impractical to effectuate a donor's specific intent, the determining factors
should be expressly recognized.
13 Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843 (1949).
14 Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
15 N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:25 (1959).
16 Ibid.
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itable purpose.'7 The issue of whether Amherst College could benefit from the
doctrine of cy pres after it had brought about failure of the gift is not discussed by
the court. The New Jersey court, rather than substitute a new trustee because of
the original trustee's refusal, allowed a broader classification of beneficiaries than
had been indicated by the testator. It has apparently become the law in New
Jersey that a charitable institution can accept a trust fund on its own terms rather
than on the terms of the testator. This is illustrated in Amherst by the fact that it was
only those terms of the trust to which the trustee objected which were deleted. The
requirement that the beneficiaries of the trust be American-born was not deleted
because it was not a classification objected to by Amherst College.
In other cases, trustees have been precluded from resort to the benefit of cy
pres when the impossibility of administering the fund was brought about by the
trustees' conduct.'8 In Connecticut College v. United States,9 the trustee was not
allowed to have cy pres applied for its benefit because of its refusal to carry out
the administration of the fund in exact compliance with the terms of the testator.
The situation in the Connecticut case is similar to that in the present case, but a
different solution was reached. The federal court held that the testator's intention
was paramount and the trustee's deviation from the terms of the trust would be
an improper application of cy pres. The testator's intention would be violated if
the trust were accepted solely on terms set by the trustee. In the Amherst case, on
the other hand, the court respected the wishes of the trustee rather than the express
intention of the testator.
The element of cy pres on which the court in the Amherst case places most
emphasis is that of general intention. The etymology of "cy pres" gives some idea of
the court's concern for the intention aspect of this doctrine20 in cases involving racial
and religious restrictions.2 1 Cy pres has generally been considered as an intention-
enforcing device. However, in cy pres cases there often is a conflict between the
policies of effectuating the testator's intent and attempting to preserve the public
benefit of a charitable trust. Often the testator's intent must be violated so that the
trust will not be lost to charitable purposes.
Furthermore, the construction of the will and the surrounding circumstances in
Amherst were such as to force the court to violate the testator's intent no matter
what course it chose. The fact that the deceased left nearly his entire estate for
charitable purposes was evidence of his desire not to benefit his heirs; but, if the
charitable bequest were defeated, the $50,000 destined for Amherst College would
pass to the heirs (distant cousins with whom the testator had no contact and for
whom, the court said, he had no affection). Indeed, his intention would also be
defeated if the court applied cy pres so as to substitute another institution as recipient
of the fund. In emphasizing the testator's dedication to, and affection for, Amherst
College, it was inferred that the college was the one whom the testator most intended
to benefit by the fund.
The solution arrived at by the court, while it constitutes a straining of the tradi-
tional doctrine of cy pres, was a fair and workable one. The court avoided discussing
the discriminatory aspect of the restrictions which the testator included in his
bequest, but its conclusion points up a disapproval of religious restrictions on the
17 In re Faulknew's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 2d 575, 275 P.2d 818 (1954).
18 See, e.g., Connecticut College v. United States, 276 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Presi-
dent and Fellows of Harvard College v. Jewett, 11 F.2d 491 (1925).
19 276 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
20 Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 65 A.2d 843 (1949). The judicial power of cy pres is
invocable to effectuate the more general intention to devote the property to charitable uses.
The words "cy pres" are Norman French, meaning "so near" or "as near"; the term itself
suggests the limitations of the principle.
21 LaFond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W. 2d 530 (1959); In re Girard's
Estate, 386 Pa.548, 127 A.2d 287, 353 U.S. 230, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 cert. denied, 359
U.S. 570 (1958); see 35 NoTR DAME LAWYER 277 (1959).
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distribution of funds for charitable purposes. While these restrictions would probably
be observed in the case of a private trust, the public interest in charitable trusts takes
precedence over the peculiar predilections of the donor. Because of the nature of
charities, the usual rule against perpetuities is not applied to the donor's right to dis-
tribute his property; the price the donor must pay for this greater latitude in per-
petuating his estate is the likelihood that the terms of the trust will be modified.
Professor Scott, in justifying judicial modification of the wishes of a testator creating
a charitable trust, writes:
Some vain and obstinate donors indeed might prefer to have their own way
forever, whether that way should ultimately prove beneficial or not. But why
should effect be given to such an unreasonable desire? A man is not allowed
to control the disposition of property for private purposes beyond the period
of perpetuities. The Rule against Perpetuities is inapplicable to charities
only because the public interest is supposed to be promoted by the creation
of charities. The public interest is not promoted by the creation of a charity
which by the lapse of time ceases to be useful. The founder of a charity
should understand therefore that he cannot create a charity which shall be
forever exempt from modification.22
Somewhat the same reasoning permeates the Amherst opinion. The result was the
defeat of an intention to perpetuate indefinitely the use of property for a discrimina-
tory use, through the unlikely application of a doctrine which purports to be an
intention-enforcing device.
Cornelius F. Collins
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FREEDOM OF THE PRESS - COURT ORDER FORBIDDING
PHOTOGRAPHY, TELEVISION, AND RADIO FAciLrrES ON STREETS AND SIDEWALKS
SURROUNDING COURTHOUSE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. -Early in October, 1958, a
Georgia church was bombed. Five men were jailed on suspicion of the crime and
petitioned for habeas corpus; a hearing was set for October 17. On October 16,
counsel for the five suspects addressed a large crowd from the courthouse steps.
The addresses were recorded for radio and television, and a large number of "still"
photographs were taken. The day of the hearing, the five suspects were brought
to the courthouse in a bus. As they alighted, shackled to a chain, they were photo-
graphed. The corridor outside the courtroom was crowded with people, including
several photographers who again took pictures of the five men, both inside and
outside the courtroom.
After the hearing was over, counsel for the men again addressed a crowd from
the courthouse steps. This time, there were two or three hundred people present,
and traffic was completely blocked in the street. Television, radio, and "still" photo-
graphers covered the event. The five men, having been indicted for capital offenses
arising out of the bombing, were assigned for trial before a judge of the Superior
Court of Fulton County. On November 3, the judge issued the following order:
No photograph of any party to any trial, or of any defendant, prosecutor,
attorney, witness, juror, spectator, or other participant in or at any trial,
shall be taken at any place in the courthouse building, on the courthouse
steps or on the adjacent sidewalks and public streets. Nothing said or
done by any such person at any such place shall be recorded by any tele-
vision instrument, moving-picture camera . . . or other recording device
or equipment.
Plaintiff brought suit below to have the order vacated as unduly abridging
plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and under the
Georgia Constitution, to freedom of speech and of the press. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Georgia, plaintiff excepted only to that part of the order which
related to the streets and sidewalks surrounding the courthouse. Held: The order
was valid. Judges of lower courts have a wide discretion in the management of
business before them, and this discretion will not be controlled unless manifestly
22 ScoTT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TEE LAw OF TRUSTS 14 (1940).
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abused. The duty and disposition of a court to accord ample scope to the liberty
of the press should not be carried to the point of an undue abridgment of the
court's own freedom. Atlanta Newspapers Inc. v. Grimes, 114 S.E.2d 421, (Ga.
1960), appeal dismissed and certiorari denied, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3101.
Recent decisions have stated that there is no constitutionally protected right
of access to news sources, as distinguished from the right to publish what news has
been found.1 As Judge Goodrich said, in Tribune Review Pub. v. Thomas,2
Can it be argued that there is some constitutional right for everybody not
to be interfered with in finding things out about everybody else? . . . Could
an interested observer insist on the constitutional right to take moving
pictures of a private family in and about its household contrary to that
family's wishes? We think that this question of getting at what one wants
to know is a far cry from the type of freedom of expression, comment, and
criticism so fully protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution.3
Clearly any suggestion that a newsman - or anyone else - has an unrestricted
constitutional right to find out what he wants to know is untenable, whether
viewed from the viewpoint of the citizen who wishes to be left alone or of those
charged with maintaining national security. On the other hand, it is a truism that
there are no unrestricted constitutional rights. Opposed to the view that there is
no right of access to news is the argument made by Judge Musmanno, dissenting in
In re Mack:4 "Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish
it, and circulate it. When any one of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom
of the press becomes a river without water." s
In this view, if every agency of government and every private news source
acted as though the press had no right of access to news, freedom of the press
would become an empty guarantee.
One solution of this dilemma of opposing interests, at least for present purposes,
may lie in making certain relevant distinctions. The fact that photographic media
are now protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments6 should not obscure
the fact that there are differences between these media and the written news media,
especially with reference to press coverage of court proceedings. The presence of
a photographer, whether he is taking still pictures, movies, or television tapes, tends
to make of every man an actor. This phenomenon can be a great distraction to
anyone participating in the photographed event. 7 He may "play to the galleries"
and conduct himself in a fundamentally dishonest manner in an effort to make the
proper "image" in the mind of the unseen viewer.8 The presence of newspaper
reporters unaccompanied by photographers possibly does not produce this reaction.
Secondly, the effect of photographic media upon the public at large is more
immediate than the effect of written communications. No verbal description can
so effectively convey the plight of a criminal-nor, given adverse public opinion,
damn him so completely -as a picture of him in chains.
Judges have expressed some doubt whether photography serves the social
interest represented by a free press as well as the written media. Some judges feel
that photography "... . does not inform the public as to any material fact, and serves
no purpose except to pander to the lower tastes of some individuals." 9 (This state-
ment was made with regard to the contention of a group of newspapermen that they
ought to have the right to photograph an accused murderer during his trial.)
1 Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, (3d Cir. 1958); United Press v.
Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
2 Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
3 Id. at 885.
4 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
5 Id. at 689.
6 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1951).
7 DouoLAs, THE PUBLIC TRIAL AND THE FREE PRESs, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 843 (1960).
8 Ibid.
9 In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679, 682 (1956).
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Finally, allowing photographers to take pictures at will in and about courts
might tend to subvert one of the ends which freedom of speech supposedly serves
- the right to a fair trial. As Justice Douglas has stated:
The public trial exists because of the aversion which liberty-loving people
had toward secret trials . . . not because the Framers wanted to provide
the public with recreation or with instruction in the ways of government.0
On the other hand, unrestricted picture-taking at trials might well cause a
circus atmosphere to prevail, and resulting publicity might make a just verdict
impossible, especially if the case has aroused public anger. Of course it might be
said that the same objection can be made to allowing the written coverage of trials.
The prevailing attitude is apparently that the advantages to be gained through
allowing reporters at trials outweigh the disadvantages."' When these considerations
are laid beside those weighed in the recent "no right of access" decisions, it is justi-
fiable to assume that photographers, at least, do not have a constitutionally pro-
tected right of access to news sources.
Grimes raises questions other than the immediate constitutional issue. The
Georgia court has sanctioned an extensive exercise of the judical power over court
proceedings. In forbidding photography in the streets, the order covers a greater
physical area than is usually the subject of judicial scrutiny; in forbidding photog-
raphy of spectators and witnesses, it covers an unusually large number of people.
It is universally admitted that courts have power to prohibit photography
in the courtroom. Where photography is not expressly forbidden by a standing
rule of court,' 2 judges have inherent power to prohibit it by ad hoc orders and
contempt proceedings.' 3
This power has been held to extend to the corridors about the courtroom,"
but no case has been found which covers a wider area, except in the case of criminal
defendants. Specific prohibitions against photographing these defendants between
court and jail have been upheld.' 5
The reasons given by the courts fall naturally into three categories, whatever
the verbal formulation may be: (1) protecting criminal defendants against exces-
sive publicity; (2) keeping order in and around the court; and (3) maintaining
dignity and decorum in court proceedings.
Protecting the defendant
The first reported case dealing with a court's right to forbid photography
within its precincts is Ex parte Sturm.' 6 There, a judge detected a photographer
taking pictures of a criminal defendant. The judge informed the photographer
that he intended to forbid such pictures for the duration of the trial and requested
the plate of the picture he had just taken. The photographer gave the judge a
blank plate. Later, after the judge had published an anti-picture order, another
photographer used a secret camera to take pictures of the trial. The judge cited
both for contempt; and their convictions were upheld, the appellate court stating
that the court below had power to protect the helpless defendant from excessive
publicity. Undoubtedly, a major element in the decision was the deceit practiced
by the photographer in giving the judge below a blank plate. This fits the layman's
10 DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 7 at 842.
11 See, e.g., People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1954). The British courts
do not feel this way, and severely restrict press comment on pending litigation. DOUGLAS, Op.
cit. supra note 7, 840.
12 E.g., FED. R. Ceam. P. 53.
13 State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 429
(1955); Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927). See In re Jameson, 340 P.2d 423
(Colo. 1959, and Comment, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 165 (1959).
14 Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); In re Mack, 386
Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
15 In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
16 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
definition of "contempt"; dishonest conduct, concededly, is subject to the strongest
disapproval.
Protection of the defendant was also a material ground of decision in In re
Mack,17 where the challenged rule forbade taking pictures of any criminal defen-
dant between court and jail, and forbade taking any pictures at all within 40 feet
of the courtroom. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that courts have
the power-and the duty-to protect the "right of privacy" of the prisoner.'8
While the use of the term "right of privacy" is unfortunate, since ordinarily this
protection is less extensive for one who attracts substantial public attention, 9 the
court in effect recognized the reasonableness of protecting prisoners from the extra-
legal punishment of photographic publicity.
In Brumfield v. State20 the court below had forbidden taking pictures of a
man accused of rape. The Supreme Court of Florida found another social interest
to protect in upholding the order- the right to a fair trial.
Keeping order in and around the court
The desire to keep order is the rationale behind In re Seed,2' in which it was
found that a photographer who had taken pictures with a flashpowder outfit outside
the courtroom door had violated an anti-disturbance statute because of the attendant
fire and smoke. The judge also said that taking pictures of defendants might pre-
cipitate disturbance because of the attempts of the individuals photographed to
protect themselves. Here, the grounds for decision are connected with the desire
to avoid physical disruption of court proceedings.
In State v. Clifford,22 the photographer violated a specific court order against
photography, and took pictures in the courtroom, using a flash camera. In uphold-
ing a contempt citation, the court said, "It is enough that the defendant's acts
... caused a distraction or had the potential possibility of doing sO. '23
Maintaining the dignity of the court
A constant theme in all the decisions is that the courts have power to forbid
photography to maintain "dignity" and "decorum" in court proceedings. Canon
35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association (which pro-
hibits courtroom photography) cites the maintenance of dignity and decorum as
the chief reason for its prohibition.
The words connote lack of tension, absence of a "circus" atmosphere and a
public image of calm, just deliberation -all qualities which photography is likely
to impair. However, one state has apparently endorsed courtroom photography; 24
most jurisdictions which have considered the problem regard photography as
injurious to dignity and decorum.
None of the decisions above cited involves an order forbidding photography
more than 40 feet from the courtroom door, except those which involve criminal
defendants. Even in those cases, regardless of the distance from courtroom
to jail, only one subject has been judicially barred from the cameras. The opinion
in Grimes contains none of the three conventional justifications of an anti-photog-
raphy rule. The reasoning that the defendants must be protected from adverse
publicity which might injure the fairness of their trial seems obviated by the fact
that the church bombers' counsel twice gathered a crowd and addressed them for
the benefit of radio and television. Counsel made no objection apparent on the
17 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
18 Id. at 683.
19 PROSSER, TORTS 643 (2d ed. 1955).
20 108 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1959).
21 140 Misc. 681, 251 N.Y.S. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
22 164 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 429 (1955).
23 Id. at 123 N.E.2d 11.
24 In re Canon 35, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
RECENT DECISIONS
record against any photography of the bombers; in fact, the inference could well
be drawn from the record that the church bombers were seeking publicity.
As to keeping order in the court, it is difficult to see how taking pictures in
the street could possibly cause disorder in courtrooms which ranged from two to
six floors above the street.25 If the crowds caused disorder, it would seem more
reasonable to disperse the crowd. Finally, it is unlikely that photography in the
street reflects in any way upon the dignity of court proceedings, or impairs in any
way courtroom decorum. The milling crowd below would have had a more adverse
effect; yet the crowd was allowed to gather two days running without dispersal.
The Grimes court did not adopt any of the traditional reasons for banning
photography. It chose, in effect, to ratify the action of the trial judge by stating
that he had not abused his discretion. It has apparently become the law in Georgia
that a judge, for any reason, or for no reason, can forbid the taking of pictures in
the street outside his courtroom.
Joseph P. Summers
PRICES - RESTRAINT OF TRADE - COOPERATION TO MAINTAIN PRICE LEVELS
ILLEGAL UNDER SHERMAN ACT.- In 1956, Parke, Davis & Co. instituted a special
program to enforce a resale price maintenance policy on its drug products in the
Baltimore-Washington-Richmond area. No "fair trade' statutes1 were in effect
in those jurisdictions. The enforcement policy included the cooperation of whole-
salers by their refusals to deal with price-cutting retailers. On complaint of Dart
Drug, a large retail drug chain, the Justice Department sought an injunction on
the ground that Parke Davis had combined and conspired, in violation of Sections
1 and 3 of the Sherman Act,2 to maintain resale prices.
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the action
holding'that the government had shown no right to relief.3 The Justice Department
made a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 2 of the Expediting
Act.4 Held: reversed. The inclusion of wholesalers in a program to gain retailers'
adherence to a resale price policy created a combination with the wholesalers and
retailers in violation of the Sherman Act. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960).-
The key feature of the special enforcement program was the cooperation of the
five drug wholesalers in the area. Although each was individually approached by
Parke Davis, each knew that the others had been similarly informed of the new
program. Specifically, the wholesalers were informed that Parke Davis would
refuse to sell to them if they cut the schedule prices on Parke Davis products. In
addition, they were warned that they would be cut off if they sold to any price-
cutters at the retail level. The wholesalers cooperated with Parke Davis and did,
25 Atlanta Newspapers Inc. v. Grimes, 114 S.E.2d 421, 426 (1960).
1 Congress has provided that agreements regulating resale prices made in states with
so-called "fair trade" statutes shall not be held illegal under the Sherman Act.
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The relevant wording of § 1 provides:
"Every contract, combination . .. or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states . . . is declared to be illegal."
3 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.C. 1958).
4 32 Stat. 823 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
5 The Court said at 45:
In thus involving the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke Davis products
to the retailers, thereby inducing retailers' adherence to its suggested retail
prices, Parke Davis created a combination with the retailers and the whole-
salers to maintain resale prices and violated the Sherman Act... that entire
policy was tainted with the "vice of . . . illegality" . . . when Parke Davis
used it as the vehicle to gain wholesalers' participation in the program to
effectuate the retailers' adherence to the suggested retail prices.
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in fact, refuse to sell to "known" price-cutters and to others whose names were
supplied to them by Parke Davis.
The District Court decision was based primarily on the principles set forth in
United States v. Colgate & Co.,6 which has long been considered to have estab-
lished what a manufacturer or seller may do to enforce resale price policies. On
the other hand, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 7 the earlier of the
two cases, showed what was clearly prohibited in the area of resale price main-
tenance.
Dr. Miles involved a series of agreements between Miles and wholesalers and
retailers engaged in the sale of Miles' products. While purporting to be "agency"
contracts, the primary effect of the agreements was regulation of resale prices.
The Court held that the contracts were violations of the Sherman Act and that
the entire enforcement system was a restraint of trade at common law; a manufac-
turer or seller may not make contracts with wholesalers or retailers to regulate
resale prices.
The enforcement program in Colgate was more subtle. Its key features
included: 1) announcement of the policy against price-cutting; 2) a refusal to
sell to price-cutters; 3) sales to price-cutters, subject to promises and assurances
that the policy would be complied with in the future. There were no written
contracts. The case turned on the interpretation that the trial court placed on
the indictment. The government argued that the indictment fairly charged a
Sherman Act violation within the doctrine of Dr. Miles. The Court disagreed and
held that the Colgate policy was not within the Dr. Miles rule s
If the government, in Colgate, had simply neglected any reference to agree-
ments in the indictment, the Court would have been without grounds to disagree with
the trial court. But the indictment charged that Colgate had requested promises and
assurances of compliance and had received the same from dealers who, because
of earlier price-cutting, had been cut off by Colgate.9 That the promises, although
not written contracts, were conditions of sale is clear from the fact that Colgate
would not sell to price-cutters unless such promises were given in advance; the
indictment did not fail to specify those promises. Nevertheless, the Court held that
there were no agreements within the Dr. Miles doctrine.
Had the agreements in Miles been upheld, it would appear that Miles would
have been able to enforce the agreements in court against price-cutting dealers,
for those agreements clearly restricted the rights of dealers when the products were
in their control. Not so, however, in Colgate; the agreements-i.e., that the
dealers would comply as a condition of sale - did not contemplate judicial enforce-
ment. Colgate's only remedy was a refusal to deal with them in the future. But
the language of the Colgate Court, in discussing the interpretation of the indictment,
implies that the offensive feature of the Miles contracts was their "restraining"
effect on dealers. Moreover, the Colgate Court went on to say, "In Dr. Miles . . .
the unlawful combination was effected through contracts which undertook to pre-
vent dealers from freely exercising the right to sell." 10 Indeed, the holding of
the Miles Court, that the entire enforcement system was a common law restraint
of trade, leads to the same conclusion. Apparently, the Court in Colgate felt that
the promises which were conditions of sale were not "restrainino."
6 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
7 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
8 "[W]e must conclude that . . . the indictment does not charge Colgate & Company
with selling its products to dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell
except at prices fixed by the company." United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. at 306.
9 Id. at 303. The indictment listed a summary of the actions taken to enforce the price
policy. Included were the following: "requests to offending dealers for assurances and
promises of future adherence to prices, which were often given; . . . [s]imilar assurances and
promises required of, and given by, other dealers followed by sales of them." (Emphasis
added.)
10 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307.
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But Colgate is remembered, not for its apparent inconsistencies, but for the
positive assurances it gave to manufacturers or sellers desiring to maintain a resale
price policy without running afoul of the Sherman Act.
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged
in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his independent discretion
as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce
in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell. 1'
In 1920, the same problem was presented to the Supreme Court in United
States v. Shrader's Son, Inc.'2 The Court added to Dr. Miles, in dicta, the stipula-
tion that the agreement need not be written. It might be implied from ". . . a
course of dealing or other circumstances." '1 Shrader lends weight to the position
that, in 1920, the thinking of the Court was that some kind of legally enforceable
agreement was necessary in order to establish a Shermai Act violation in resale
price maintenance. The most significant element of Shrader is the District Court
opinion of Judge Westenhauer.' 4 Although he was reversed by the Supreme Court,
he very ably argued that the Court's "enforceable agreements" standard was insuffi-
cient. He pointed out that other methods of cooperative price-fixing were every
bit as restraining as a written agreement.15 The net effect of the Westenhauer
opinion is that it portended the position that the Supreme Court would ultimately
take.
The "enforceable agreements" standard was again confirmed in 192 1,16 but
a significant departure took place the next year., In Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co.,'7 the Court, for the first time, struck down a price main-
tenance policy that did not involve enforceable agreements and went beyond the
limits established by Colgate. The key elements of Beech-Nut's intricate policy
included: 1) involvement of wholesalers and jobbers in the enforcement policy by
refusing to sell to them if they in turn sold to price-cutters; 2) jobbers, wholesalers
and retailers previously cut off by Beech-Nut were reinstated through "declarations,
assurances, statements, promises and similar expressions" that they would thereafter
comply with the policy. Of all the factors in Beech-Nut,"8 the Court made it
impressively clear that the objectionable features were those that involved the
cooperation of Beech-Nut and its wholesalers to maintain the policy at the retail
level, features that made the entire policy an "unfair method of competition" within
the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act.19
11 Id. at 307.
12 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
13 Id. at 99.
14 United States v. Shrader's Son, 264 Fed. 175 (N.D. Ohio, 1919).
15 Id. at 183.
16 Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
17 257 U.S. 441 (1922). The Court said, at 455:
The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom of competition
by methods in which the company secures the cooperation of its distributors
and customers, which are quite as effectual as agreements, express or implied
intended to accomplish the same purpose. (Emphasis added.)
18 The Court at no time indicated which element of the Beech-Nut policy was the one
that made the sum total of all the features illegal. Indeed, the impression is given that the
Court considered all the factors as a single, illegal policy. However, the wording noted makes
it apparent that it was the cooperation with wholesalers that was most offensive and led the
Court to look on the entire policy as an "unfair method of competition."
19 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1958). Section 45, as originally enacted,
provided in part, "The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent ... unfair methods
of competition in commerce ... " Referring to the injunction that the Commission sought,
the Beech-Nut Court stated:
The order should have required the company to cease and desist from
carrying into effect its so-called Beech-Nut Policy by cooperative methods
in which the respondent and its distributors, customers and agents under-
take to prevent others from obtaining the company's products at less than
the prices designated by it. 257 U.S. 441, at 455.
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Beech-Nut was initiated by the Commission under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Parke Davis, on the other hand, is a Sherman Act case.
But the distinction is academic when, in the words of the Court in Beech-Nut,
the Sherman Act is relevant because "it shows a declaration of policy to be con-
sidered in determining what are unfair methods of competition .. ." 20
From the point of view of policy, Beech-Nut condemns methods of resale
price maintenance which involve the cooperation of wholesalers in the maintenance
system; it is the last significant case in the body of law which led up to the decision
in Parke Davis.2 1
Justice Harlan, in dissent,22 has condemned the Parke Davis decision; it is his
opinion that the Court overruled Colgate, while expressing judicial respect for it.
However, while not expressly stating so, it seems clear that the majority intended
to keep the positive assurances of Colgate intact.2 Had it been content with the
two steps sanctioned in Colgate-the policy announcement and the refusal
to deal-the Court seems to infer that Parke Davis would not have violated the
Sherman Act.
But there was more to Colgate than these two steps. Price-cutters were dealt
with because they gave assurances and promises that they would comply with the
price policy in the future. Significantly, the Court in Parke Davis does not refer
to that element of Colgate. On the contrary, the opinion infers that mandatory
promises and assurances from retailers go beyond the allowable limits of price policy
enforcement.
The fact is that Colgate turned on an interpretation of an indictment which
charged more than (1) announcement of a policy and (2) refusals to deal. Now,
however, the Parke Davis Court holds that those two methods alone are all that
may be employed to enforce a price policy. The holding in Colgate did not say
that; the dicta in the opinion may be fairly interpreted to mean that. Perhaps the
more accurate statement is that, while Colgate itself is dead, the ramifications of
the Court's dicta in that decision are still very much alive.24
As a practical matter, it is difficult to comprehend the present utility of Colgate
to the corporation desiring to enforce a price policy. To argue that a price policy
can be effectively administered and maintained by announcement of the policy
and simple refusals to deal with price-cutters is to blind oneself to the realities of
modern business practices.
The second point of the Harlan dissent is that the business community, as
Justice Harlan puts it, is left "wholly in the dark" 25 as to what the purported new
standard is for the establishment of a combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade.
The Court does not dwell at any length on meeting the requirements of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, though it is apparent that, in the Court's opinion,
the government overcame that statutory hurdle. The majority notes that the volun-
tary acquiescence of dealers in a seller's price policy has the same economic effect
20 Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, at 453.
21 See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). Though
the case adds little to Beech-Nut, it is helpful in seeing the Supreme Court view, in 1944,
of the law leading to Parke Davis.
22 Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker joined in the dissent.
23 "Parke Davis did not content itself with announcing its policy regarding retail prices
and following with a simple refusal to have business relations with any retailers who disre-
garded the policy." United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, at 45.
24 In George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1960), the court commented on the remaining life left in Colgate as a result of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Parke Davis (at 790):
The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manu-
facturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric
simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enter-
prise.
25 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, at 53.
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as a prohibited combination would have. But the Court adds that this is tolerated
as long as Colgate is not overruled.
When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement
of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, this countervailing considera-
tion (toleration) is not present and therefore he has put together a com-
bination in violation of the Sherman Act.2 6
This, apparently, is the "purported new standard" that Justice Harlan refers to
in the dissent.
For corporate counsel engaged in advising clients on the limits of permissible
resale price maintenance, the rule seems to raise more questions than it answers.
Admittedly, the abstract standard for price maintenance enforcement is clearer,
but the perennial problem of how to handle a price-cutter who wants to get back
on the list of approved customers is aggravated by the decision. He must, it would
seem, give an assurance of his intention to comply with the price policy. In Colgate,
promises and assurances of future compliance were sustained; but Parke Davis
holds that the seller may not go beyond announcement and refusals to deal. The
corporate litigant will find it difficult to show that the promises and assurances
of future compliance given by previously "cut-off' dealers- which seem necessary
if there is to be reason for putting the price-cutter back on the list of acceptable
retailers-are neither agreements nor cooperative methods. Such assurances and
promises go beyond the narrow limits of Colgate, as the Court now interprets that
case, and, on that basis alone, would appear to be condemned.
The more significant problem raised by Parke Davis is how to avoid the suspect
cooperation in maintaining a price policy. Inevitably, there are complaint letters
written by customers of the price-maintaining seller; complaints of violations of
the policy by competitors. The desirable answer to the complainant is an assurance
from the manufacturer that the violator will be cut off, or, at the very least, warned.
A letter that says less is unsatisfying to the complaining customer who, in good
faith, is abiding by the established price policy. It seems logical on the basis of
Parke Davis, however, to argue that such cooperation of seller and customer is
enforcing a price policy on another customer is a combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade. Given the attitude of the Supreme Court as seen in Parke Davis
-a tendency to find a "combination" without concern for any clear standard-
and the apparent dislike of price maintenance policies by the Justice Department,
Parke Davis is a warning to counsel of the dangers inherent in what appears to be
an involuntary combination. For good or ill, Parke Davis reduces available methods
of enforcing minimum price policies. In addition, the opinion reveals a liberal
attitude toward what is required to find a combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade. The latter ramification of the decision raises questions that go far beyond
price policies, into a broader area of antitrust law. It is precisely this implication
which promises to be the mischief of Parke Davis.2 7
Michael E. Phenner
REAL PROPERTY-EASEIIENTS -CESSATION OF NEcEssrry HELD NOT TO Ex-
TINGUISH EASEMENT CREATED BY "IMPLIED GRANT"- Plaintiffs, landowners,
brought suit to extinguish defendant's claim of easement of ingress and egress
over plaintiffs' land, which adjoined that of the defendant; both lots were at one
26 Id. at 44. It is interesting here to note the use given by the Court to its interpretation
of Colgate. In effect, that interpretation becomes the standard for determining a Sherman
Act combination in the area of resale price maintenance. But that interpretation is taken
from the dicta, not the holding, of Colgate.
27 On July 5, 1960, the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia again denied
the injunction sought by the government in Parke Davis. A trade service for the drug and
cosmetic industry noted that Judge Joseph R. Jackson, in an oral opinion, denied the injunc-
tion on the grounds that the Parke Davis price policy had long been discontinued. See,
F-D-C REPORTS, Vol. 22, No. 28 (July, 1960).
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time part of a large tract under the ownership of one Darke, who, in 1869, sub-
divided his land and sold the individual lots. That same year a map was filed
showing the tract as subdivided into numbered lots, together with perpendicular
and horizontal areas running north to south and east to west. These areas were
designated "lanes" and were not numbered. Plaintiffs' land was originally a seg-
ment of one of these lanes. At the time of the subdivision, the land presently
owned by the plaintiffs was the only possible access to a public street from the
land presently owned by the defendant. In 1912, a new public street was opened,
giving direct access to the land presently owned by the defendant and thereby
making unnecessary the- use of plaintiffs' lot as a means of ingress and egress to a
public street. Defendant acquired title to her lot in 1923; plaintiffs acquired title
to their property in 1955. The Supreme Court, Special Term,1 gave judgment for
the plaintiffs and was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.2 On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, held: reversed and new trial granted. An easement had
arisen by an "implied grant" and therefore could not be extinguished by the mere
cessation of the necessity for its existence. Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165
N.E.2d 178 (1960).
The plaintiffs urged the court to find that an easement of necessity or "way of
necessity" had originally arisen in favor of the land owned by the defendant. A
way of necessity exists where the land conveyed is completely surrounded by land
of the grantor, or by his land and that of a stranger. The law implies from these
facts that a right of way exists for the benefit of the grantee's estate.' Such an
implication is not made as a mere matter of convenience to the grantee and does
not exist when the grantee may reach a public highway over his own land.4 Such
an easement is never implied over the land of a stranger and, for this reason, the
dominant and servient estates must have both been owned at one time by the same
person.
5
The trial court found that the easement in Gerbig was created by means of
an "implied grant." It then stated:
Are such easements, once found to have existed as a matter of pre-
sumed intention, to be forever inviolate and permanently to remain a clog
on land titles? I have reached the conclusion that where the reason for
the original implication ceases, the easement should, in the absence of
compelling circumstances, itself expire ...
[L]and titles should not be subject to implied, as distinguished
from express, encumbrances unless such burdens are reasonably necessary
for the enjoyment of neighboring properties .... Since the easement was
implied so that purchasers of interior lots may have access to and from
their land, the implication ceases when a public highway has been built
affording both parties free and untrammeled approach to and from that
highway.6
The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. It seems clear that the
trial court and the Appellate division agreed (1) that the easement originally
arose by "implied grant," and (2) that such an easement terminates when the
reason for the original implication ceases.
The Court of Appeals, agreeing as to point (1) above, took issue with the
lower court's theory on the manner of extinguishing an easement by "implied
grant." The Court held that such an easement could not be extinguished by the
mere cessation of the necessity which originally gave rise to its implication.
[Wihile aware of the legal distinction, the court equated this easement
by grant with an easement by necessity....
1 Gerbig v. Zumpano, 13 Misc. 2d 357, 177 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
2 Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 (App. Div. 2d) 904, 182 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1959).
3 Violet v. Martin, 62 Mont. 335, 205 Pac. 221 (1922).
4 Backhausen v. Mayer, 204 Wis. 286, 234 N.W. 904 (1931); accord, Carey v. Rae,
58 Cal. 159 (1881).
5 Bowles v. Chapman, 180 Tenn. 232, 175 S.W.2d 313 (1943).
6 Gerbig v. Zumpano, 13 Misc. 2d 904, 177 N.Y.S.2d 969, 973 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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We reach a different conclusion. It is the law of this state that an
easement created by grant, express or implied, can only be extinguished by
abandonment, conveyance, condemnation, or adverse possession.
The mere fact that this easement might originally have been created
out of necessity does not alter the means by which it was created, i.e., by
grant, and as such it remains as inviolate as the fee favored by the
grant.. . . 7
A new trial was granted to allow plaintiff to prove defendant's abandonment of
the easement.
Thus, Gerbig seems to have turned on a matter of classification. The lower
courts held that an easement by "implied grant" should be extinguished when the
reason for the original implication ceases. The lower courts, therefore, thought of
an easement by "implied grant" as a type of easement arising by implication from
the presumed intent of the original grantor, subject to termination when the reason
for its implication ceases. The Court of Appeals, however, thought that such an
easement was essentially one arising by grant, and therefore "as inviolate as the
fee favored by the grant," subject to extinguishment only by abandonment, con-
veyance, condemnation, or adverse possession and not by the mere cessation of
the necessity for its existence.
It is submitted that the trial court, in ruling that there was an easement by
"implied grant," opened the door to reversal; the Court of Appeals seized upon
the word "grant" as a justification for treating the easement as though it had
been created by an express grant in the conveyance. It seems clear, however, that,
since the original grantee of the land could not have used his land unless allowed
an easement to the public highway from the land, a way of necessity arose.8 This
7 Gerbig v. Zumpano, 7 N.Y.2d 327, 165 N.E.2d 178, 180 (1960). In Kux v. Chandler,(action by landowners to determine whether or not an easement existed on the plaintiffs'
land in favor of defendants) the court said:
Ways of necessity cannot be founded upon an express grant but are
dependent upon an implied grant or reservation. These statements are
based in pure logic, for in a grant or prescriptive right not growing out
of necessity, a perpetual estate is created. However, if the necessity creates
an implied grant, or, as in this case, a reservation, there is, as above
indicated, no authority to the effect that such . .. [implied] grant is per-
petual and survives the existence of a necessity. 112 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
8 2 WALSH COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 234 (1947):
By far the most usual instance of an easement of necessity is a way
of necessity. Such an easement ordinarily arises when one conveys to
another land entirely surrounded by his, the grantor's land, or which is
accessible only across either the grantor's land or the land of a stranger.
In such a case, unless the conveyance is regarded as giving, as appur-
tenant to the land conveyed, a right of way over the land retained by
the grantor, the grantee can make but a limited use, if any, of the land
conveyed to him, and the courts, in pursuance of considerations of public
policy favorable to the full utilization of the land, and in accordance with
the presumable intention of the parties that the land shall not be without
any means of access thereto, have established this rule of construction
that, in the absence of indications to a contrary intention, the convey-
ance of the land shall in such case be regarded as vesting in the grantee
a right of way across the grantor's land.
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 793 (3d ed. 1939).
When the owner of land conveys the inner portion thereof, retaining
the outer portion abutting on the highway, the inner parcels being sur-
rounded on every other side by other lands of the grantor or of strang-
ers, a way of necessity arises as an implicated term of the deed conveying
the inner parcel, giving to the grantee of the inner parcel a right of way
over the outer parcel to and from the highway. This easement is implied
because of the evident necessity of such a way for the beneficial enjoyment
of the land so conveyed. Without it the grantee could not get to or from
his property without becoming a trespasser. The easement arises, there-
fore, by necessary implication as an implied term of the deed. . ..
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difference in terminology between "implied grant" and "way of necessity" becomes
crucial.
It seems probable that there would have been no reversal had the easement
in question been classified as an easement by necessity. The overwhelming weight
of authority is to the effect that an easement of necessity will cease to exist when
the necessity which occasioned it ceases.9 The reasoning of the courts in reaching
this result was set forth in the early case of Oliver v. Hook:
It is true, as contended by the appellant, that where one party deeds
to another a parcel of land surrounded by other lands, and there is no
access to the land thus conveyed, except over the lands of the grantor, the
latter gives the grantee a right of way by implication, over his own land to
that conveyed by him. But this way of necessity is a way of new creation
by operation of law, and is only provisional; for it is only brought into
existence from the necessities of the estate granted, and continues to exist
only so long as there may be a necessity for its use. If, therefore, the
grantee acquires a new way to the estate previously reached by the way
of necessity, the way of necessity is thereby extinguished.10
Termination of necessity, however, will not extinguish an easement created
by prescription" or by express grant.1 2 Therefore, whether an easement is called
"way of necessity," "easement of necessity," "implied grant," or some other term,
it is of the utmost importance to determine whether it is essentially an easement
of implication, grant, or prescription.' 3 The answer to this question will determine
whether or not the cessation of necessity will extinguish the easement. Gerbig fur-
nishes an example of the divergent results which can hinge on which of the three
alternatives is decided upon.14 Had the court decided that the easement was essen-
tially one implied from necessity, then the cessation of the necessity (when the new
street was opened in 1912) would probably have been held to have terminated it;
the plaintiff would have prevailed. Instead, the court held that the easement was
essentially one created by grant,'5 and therefore did not terminate by reason of
the opening of the new street.
It is submitted that the classification of easements made use of by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals in the instant case is a faulty one. According to
this classification, easements may arise or be created as follows:
I. By grant express
i implied
9 E.g., Whitfield v. Whittington, 99 A.2d 196 (Del. Ch. 1953); Kux v. Chandler, 112
N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Irvin v. Petitfils. 44 Cal. App. 2d 496, 112 P.2d 688 (1941);
Cassin v. Cole, 153 Cal. 611, 96 Pac. 277 (1908).
10 47 Md. 301 (1877).
11 Hendrickson v. Cruse, 22 Ky. 190, 298 S.W. 710 (1927).
12 Bagley v. Petermeier, 233 Ia. 505, 10 N.W.2d 1 (1943); Flener v. Lawrence, 187
Ky. 384, 220 S.W. 1041 (1920).
13 The same judge who wrote the Court of Appeals decision in Gerbig held, under
similar circumstances, that an easement by implication arose. A sale of land was made by
reference to maps (Nos. 500 and 630 in the opinion below). A strip of land in the map,
representing a boardwalk, was not given a lot number, nor was it subdivided into plots like
the rest of the areas for sale.
In the disposition made of this case below, it was properly held that an
easement by implication in and to the boardwalk exists in favor of the
property owners whose deeds refer to Maps Nos. 500 and 630 and to
their grantees and that an easement by implication exists in favor of the
property owners in and to Suffold Blvd. (Emphasis added). Weil v.
Atlantic Beach Holding Corp., 1 N.Y.2d 20, 150 N.Y.S.2d 13, 18, 133
N.E.2d 505, 508 (1956).
14 According to the Restatement, necessity is one of the factors giving rise to an ease-
ment by implication. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 476(e) (1944).
15 Easements by implied grant were abolished in a Montana decision, one of the grounds
being that such an easement is inconsistent with the Statute of Frauds requirement that an
easement in real property should be in writing. Simonson v. McDonald, 131 Mont. 494, 311
P.2d 982 (1957), criticized in 19 MONT. L. REv. 73 (1957). The contrary conclusion was
drawn in Mattes v. Frankel, 157 N.Y. 603, 52 N.E. 585 (1899), and in Owsley v. Hamner,
36 Cal. 2d 710, 227 P.2d 263 (1951).
RECENT DECISIONS
II. By prescription
III. By necessity'
This is not the view of the Restatement of Property, which does not distinguish
between easements by necessity and easements by implication.' 7 According to the
Restatement view easements may arise or be created:
I. By grant
II. By prescription
III. By implication 8
This method of classifying easements is more logical since it groups together ease-
ments created by the acts of the grantor (created by grant), by acts of the grantee
(created by prescription, or adverse possession), and by the courts (implication).29
The ambiguous term "implied grant" is thus eliminated. Since all implications
in the field of easements are acts of the courts, not the grantor, the inconsistency
of treating such court-made rights as though they were expressly conferred by
the grantor is apparent. The Restatement suggests that the courts should try to
effectuate the intention of the parties,20 or what the parties' intention would prob-
ably have been had they considered the matter.21
The "implied grant" easement, as conceived of by the New York Court of
Appeals, springs into existence through a judicial interpretation of the circumstances
and the presumed intention of the parties existing at the time the dominant estate
is severed from the servient estate. Once held to exist, however, it cannot be ex-
tinguished in the same manner as it was created (i.e., by judicial interpretation
of the original parties), but assumes all the inviolability and indestructability of
an easement appurtenant created by express grant. This rationale, it would seem,
militates against the public policy which discourages the unnecessary burdening
of land titles and tying up the use of land.
It is submitted that the New York Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower
courts because they equated an easement by grant with an easement by necessity,
has itself failed to distinguish between an easement by grant and an easement by
implication.
Daniel J. Manelli
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DIsTRICTs - MARRIAGE - REFUSAL TO ALLOW MARRIED
STUDENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES Is REASONABLE
EXERCISE OF LEGISLA=rV POWER- Defendant school district adopted a resolution
providing that "married students or previously married students" be restricted
wholly to classroom work, that they be barred from participating in school athletics
or other extracurricular activities; academic honors, such as valedictorian, excepted.
Appellant sought to enjoin the enforcement of this resolution against his 16-year-
old son, a returning monogram winner who, after his first season of high school
16 Gerbig v. Zumpano, 13 Misc. 2d 357, 177 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
17 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 411 (1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 38 (1944).
18 This is also the classification used in CoRPus JuRss SECONDUm. 28 CJ.S. Easements§§ 6-44 (1941).
19 This organization of the subject has been criticized by Professor Powell, who served
as a reporter on the Restatement of Property. He would leave easements by necessity as a
separate classification and not merge them into easements created by other forms of implica-
tion. 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 411 (1952).
20 Reis v. Mahony, 258 N.Y. 136, 179 N.E. 321, 323 (1932) (Cardozo, J.):
We have no thought to impair the authority of the principle repeatedly
declared that the owner of a tract, who lays out streets upon a map and
sells the subdivided lots with reference thereto, may be found by implica-
tion to have created private easements in favor of the lot owners upon the
streets thus declared to be created for their use. . . . Even so, the ques-
tion is one of intention, to be answered, like questions of intention generally,
in the light of all the circumstances.
21 See generally, Note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1959).
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football and prior to the adoption of this resolution by the school board, had married
a 15-year-old girl. The lower court's denial of the injunction was affirmed by the
Texas Court of Civil Appeals. Held: The resolution is within the rule-making
powers of the school authorities, and is not arbitrary or unreasonable since it had
a definite relation to lawful objectives sought by the board-the maintenance of
school discipline and the promotion of an efficient system of free public education.
Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959), Texas writ of error refused or dismissed.*
Children of school age are subject to both parental and school authority; they
intimately feel the effect of both every day. The basis of parental authority need
not be traced in this article. The authority of school administrators is a more
recent concept, grounded in the constitutions of the several states, which uniformly
cast upon the respective legislatures the duty of establishing and administering a
system of free public education.1 State legislatures devise a system and place the
responsibility for its operation in the hands of a school authority, independent
school district, county school board, or school trustee.2 These administrative bodies
are instructed to maintain the order and efficiency of the system by adopting rules
and regulations for the government of the system."
Resolutions of the school boards pertaining to school work or to events occurring
within the school building seldom clash with the sphere of parental authority,
although such conflicts have occurred. The Illinois Supreme Court announced
that the expulsion from school of a child who refused to study grammar as required
by the school regulations was unreasonable and arbitrary since the boy was only
obeying his father's wishes in the matter, and the school authority could not usurp
the recognized "right of the parent to determine to what extent his child should
be educated .... " 4
For the most part, however, the real conflict exists when a home activity, or
an action occurring after school, has been made the basis for disciplinary action
by the school authority. Few cases involving penalties applied to students because
of marriage have been litigated. The Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the
school trustees could not refuse to admit married students to the free public school
system, saying that it could not believe that the grounds for the resolution were
valid, i.e., that the admission of married students would have a detrimental effect
on the welfare of the unmarried students.5 Other courts, acknowledging the ex-
perience of educators in dealing with matters affecting school discipline, have per-
mitted them to determine whether a married teenager is a refining and elevating
influence in the classroom. 6 Apparently the consensus is that educators now ap-
proach the problem more intelligently.
* A similar resolution was adopted by the Bloomfield, Indiana, School Board in October,
1960. The rule bars married students from all extracurricular activities-including "com-
mencement, baccalaureate and class day." South Bend Tribune, Oct. 4, 1960, p. 2, col. 3.
(Ed.)
1 See e.g., ILL. CONST. art VIII, § 1.
2 See e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 54.
3 Tax. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 2780 (1951).
4 Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 I1. 303 (1877). Contra, State v. Weber, 108 Ind.
31, 8 N.E. 708 (1886).
5 McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 464, 465, 122 So. 737, 738 (1929):
We fail to appreciate the force of the argument. Marriage is a domestic
relation highly favored by the laws. When the relation is entered into with
correct motives, the effect on the husband and wife is refining and elevating,
rather than demoralizing. Pupils associating in school with a child occupy-
ing such a relation, it seems, would be benefited instead of harmed, and,
furthermore, it is commendable in married persons of school age to further
pursue their education, and thus become better fitted for the duties of life.
6 State v. Marion County Board of Education, 202 Tenn. 29, 32, 302 S.W.2d 57, 59
(1957):
We are accustomed to accept the testimony of experts in the various fields
of human activity as to what is reasonably necessary for the welfare of the
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A resolution which provided for the expulsion of students who married during
the school term, allowing them to return to school the following year, was approved
by the Tennessee Supreme Court.7 The resolution was the fruit of a study which
indicated to school authorities that married teenagers had a significant effect on
school atmosphere only during the first few months of the marriage, but that ap-
parently the novelty wore off after that time, and a normal environment could be
maintained with them in the classroom.
In Kissick, the Texas court faced the compelling argument that this resolution
defied an acknowledged public policy in favor of marriage by applying penalties
to persons who marry. The court dealt with this contention by declaring that
public policy in regard to marriage is a two-headed coin in Texas-on the one
side viewing with favor the marriages of persons of "lawful age" (male 21, female
18) ,s but on the other side taking a view unfavorable to and in frank discourage-
ment of "under-age marriages." As a basis for this determination, the court re-
ferred to Texas statutes which require the parents or guardians of under-age
applicants for marriage to present, in person, their consent to the clerk issuing
marriage licenses, and which require the applicants to delay the marriage for a
three-day waiting period after filing the application. 9 The court also noted a statute
which places criminal sanctions on the actions of a clerk who issues a license to
under-age applicants without requiring them to satisfy these conditions.10 Thus
the objective which the court found the school board to be seeking in applying
the resolution under attack-that of discouraging under-age marriages- was
identified as consistent with the public policy of the state. The resolution, there-
fore, could not be termed arbitrary or unreasonable.
Considering the impulsive character of teenage behavior, an alternative inter-
pretation of the cited Texas statutes is fairly suggested-the legislature intended
a public policy in favor of all marriages by persons of lawful age.' For the
youngest group of possible applicants, however, the legislature provided a period
of deliberation (the three-day waiting period), during which presumably mature
minds would be assured an opportunity to join in the consideration of the contem-
plated marriage (the condition of parental consent). Attributing to the legislature
a deep concern for the results of what might be more an act of juvenile exuberance
than the culmination of a deep, mature emotion is not inconsistent with the propo-
sition that it favors all lawful marriages.
Conceding that there are two possible interpretations of the public policy in
Texas in regard to teenage marriages, there is adequate support for the Kissick
decision on broader grounds. Courts have consistently held that the exercise of
authority by school boards has an essentially political character. In McLeod v.
State,'2 the basis of attendance in free public schools is said to be a right subject
to such reasonable rules for the government of the school as the trustees see fit to
adopt.' 3
particular activity as to which this expert therein is testifying. No reason is
suggested as to why this practice should not be followed when the witness
is an expert in the field of operating public high schools.
7 Ibid.
8 Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1959).
9 Tex. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4605 (1959).
10 TEx. PEN. CODE art. 404 (1952).
11 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 4605 (1959).
12 154 Miss. 464, 122 So. 737 (1929).
13 See Wilson v. Board of Education, 233 Ill. 464, 465, 84 N.E. 697, 698 (1908):
It was the judgment of the superintendent of schools of the city of Chicago,
as well as of the board of education, that [effect of secret societies] was
detrimental to the best interest of the schools. Whether this judgment is
sound and well founded is not subject to review by the courts. The only
question for determination is whether the rule adopted to prevent or remedy
the supposed evil was a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion
of the board.
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The question for judicial review then becomes a determination of whether
the school board has the power to regulate the particular activity, and not a con-
sideration of the aptness of the plan conceived. 14 It was once the view that the
limit on the kinds of activity which could be regulated by school authorities was
a geographic concept-one which restricted their power to the control of acts
performed within the school grounds.'5 This distinction has much of the savor of
that made between production and distribution in decisions regarding the exercise
of federal power under the Commerce Clause, 16 a distinction since rejected as
without support." Although a few states cling to this geographic concept, the
majority apparently agree that the scope of school authority is broader.18 The
Tennessee Supreme Court has defined the limit as:
Any activity of a student which can be said to have a reasonable bearing
on his or her influence upon the students or school is within the bounds of
reasonable regulation by the board in the exercise of the statutory duty vested
in it to suspend pupils when the progress and efficiency of the school makes
it necessary.' 9
It is not novel to find that the presence of married teenagers in the public schools
tends to create a disciplinary problem.2 0 The evidence adduced in Kissick included
the testimony of many officials of the local P.T.A. which was, in summary, that
married students had a direct effect on the discipline of the school and the efficiency
of the system, and that a direct and negative effect on the moral tone of the school
was generated by married students who participated in over-night athletic and band
trips. The court pointed out that the resolution under attack was a directly related
solution to this problem, a controlling fact in the conclusion reached by other courts
that a resolution found to be within the governmental powers of school authorities
was reasonable and not arbitrary.
21
There seems to be no practical necessity for attempting to formulate new con-
cepts to answer new arguments when the force of familiar principles is adequate.
Nor is there wisdom in stigmatizing one of two competing interests when the in-
terest to be protected can be vindicated without recourse to the policy of calling
the encroaching interest "undesirable." 22 The proper course of judicial decision
14 McLeod v. State, 154 Miss. 464, 465, 122 So. 737, 738 (1929):
The court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of school trustees
in matters confided by law to their discretion, unless there is a clear abuse
of discretion or a violation of law. The court will not consider whether such
rules and regulations are wise or expedient, but merely whether they are a
reasonable exercise of the authority conferred upon the trustees by law. It
is peculiarly within the province of the trustees to determine what things
are detrimental to the successful management, good order, and discipline
of the schools in their charge, and the rules required to produce those
conditions. (Emphasis added.)
15 Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, 27 Am. Rep. 343 (1877):
While [the child is] in the teacher's charge, the parent would have no right
to invade the school room and interfere with him in its management. On
the other hand, when the pupil is released and sent back home, neither the
teachers nor director have the authority to follow him thither, and govern
his conduct while under the parental eye.
16 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
17 U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Germany, 94 Miss. 469, 49 So. 515 (1877):
It may be that the school authorities would have a right to make certain
regulations and rules for the good government of the school which would
extend and control the child even when it has reached its home-but if
that power exists, it could only be done in matters which per se have a
direct and pernicious effect on the moral tone of the school, or have a
tendency to subvert and destroy the proper administration of school affairs.
19 State v. Marion County Board of Education, 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57
(1957). An even greater range of school authority was recognized in
Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562 (1871).
20 State v. Marion, 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957).
21 See, e.g., State ex rel., Bowe v. Board of Education, 63 Wis. 234, 23 N.W. 102 (1885).
22 See, for example, the apparent conflict created in Kissick with Williams v. White,
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would seem to be the determination of which interest is more important and the
approval of reasonable methods of insuring its promotion, restricting the value
comparisons to the conflict under review. By identifying marriage as another purely
domestic act which has a demonstrable influence on the interest in efficient and
orderly educational systems, the power of regulation can be recognized in the
school authorities without placing the questionable general label of "undesirable'
on young adult marriages.
Ralph H. Witt
TORTS - CHARITABLE ImmUNITY - CURRENT STATUS OF THE CHARITABLE
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE - In its fall term this year, the Michigan Supreme Court re-
pudiated a long-standing rule holding charities immune from tort liability*. This is in
accord with the present trend of judicial rejection of the doctrine.
The purpose of this article is not to elaborate on the theories or to disparage the
doctrine. The doctrine's inconsistencies and illogic are thoroughly demonstrated in
the now famous 1942 opinion by Judge Rutledge in the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia.' This discussion will concern itself with the gradual erosion of
the doctrine, especially during the last 10 years.
The doctrine of charitable immunity is based primarily on four theories: 1)
beneficiaries "waive" their right to recovery when they accept the charitable services;
2) recovery against the charitable trust will frustrate the intention of the donors; 3)
public policy requires the encouragement of charitable endeavors; and 4) the doc-
trine of respondeat superior is inapplicable to the non-profit operations of a charity.2
When Judge Rutledge delivered his 1942 opinion, very few states had held
charities liable for their torts.3 After a thorough discussion, 'he concluded that the
doctrine was about to fade from the law. The decision has had a persuasive effect in
undermining charitable immunity.4
The territory of Puerto Rico, in 1948, was the next jurisdiction to repudiate
charitable immunity.5 In 1950 Iowa overruled previous decisions holding a charitable
institution liable only for the proximate results of negligently selecting personnel, and
to strangers. 6 Subsequently, the Iowa court said: "Ain incorporated charity should
263 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), where it was said, at 668:
In keeping with this policy our courts have held that statutes regulating
the mode of entering into the marriage relation, including the consent of
the parents and provisions requiring that a license be obtained before per-
formance of the ceremony, are merely directory.
And, later in the opinion:
Art. 4605, V.A.C.S., upon which appellee so heavily relies, provides that
no County Clerk shall issue a license to marry without the consent of the
parent or guardian, if any, unless as to the male applicant that he is
twenty-one years of age and as to the female applicant that she is
eighteen years of age. There is no prohibition in this statute that those
under the stated ages shall not marry.
It would appear from a fair reading of these two cases that public policy in Texas with regard
to "underage marriages," is, at the very least, ambivalent.
*Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., Civil No. 47619, Sept. 14, 1960.
1 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942).
2 For a full analysis of the historical development and theories supporting the doctrine,
see President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Landgraver v. Emmanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 280 P.2d 301 (Ore. 1955) (dissent), 25
A.L.R.2d 29.
3 New Hampshire [Welsh v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 357, 9 A.2d 761 (1939)],
Minnesota [Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699
(1920)], Oklahoma [Gable v. -Salvation Army, 186 Okl. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940)], Utah
[Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10 Cir. 1941)].
4 The decision has been cited in 117 different cases to date.
5 Tavarez v. San Juan Lodge, 68 P.R.R. 681 (1948).
6 Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N.W. 219 (1918); Andrews v.
Y.M.C.A., 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939).
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respond as do private individuals, business corporations and others, when it does good
in the wrong way.' ' Vermont decided against immunity when first called upon to
pass on the question in 1950.8
In 1951, Delaware declared charities to be liable for the negligent selection of
servants, and subject to the doctrine of respondeat superior, even when the servants
were chosen with proper care.9 The same year Mississippi overruled an earlier de-
cision'0 holding charities liable only for negligent selection or retention of servants.
The case involved the death of a paying patient through negligence of a laboratory
technician. 1 The court rejected theories for exempting the charity, and observed the
availability of liability insurance. The case involved a paying patient; it is still possible
that Mississippi will invoke immunity where a gratuitous beneficiary is involved.
California became the third state to revoke the doctrine, in 1951, when it held a
Presbyterian church liable to children injured in an accident while begin driven home
from Bible school by seminary students.12 The rule holding charities liable only for
negligent selection of servants' 3 had been eroded by decisions permitting a paying
beneficiary14 and a stranger' s to recover. Arizona also repudiated the doctrine in
1951.28 Holding a hospital liable for the negligent handling of a cart by a nurse's
aide, the Arizona court rejected the notion that respondeat superior does not apply
when the master supplies charitable services to a third party. In declaring the paying
status of the plaintiff to have no effect on liability, the Arizona court abrogated its
previous rule 7 holding charities liable only for negligent selection of servants. The
new holding was applied again in 1952.1s
In 1952 Alaska declared charities liable for their torts by rejecting the four
reasons most often used in other jurisdictions to justify immunity.' 9 The same rule
was applied in a 1954 case. 20 In 1953 Washington overruled decisions giving charities
qualified immunity.21 Kansas' immunity rule was extended to strangers, 22 and even
to a charity as a negligent lessee,23 before being entirely repudiated in a 1954
decision.
24
An Idaho decision granting charities immunity on the "waiver" theory25 was
overruled in 1956.26 In refusing to grant immunity, the Idaho court noted that its
earlier decision had discredited the public policy and trust fund theories, with two
judges dissenting, when the "waiver" theory was adopted. The 1956 decision involved
a paying patient; it is possible that a future court may grant immunity in an action
brought by a gratuitous beneficiary.
7 Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1950).
8 Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
9 Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 7 Terry 350, 83 A.2d 753 (Del. 1951).
10 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930).
11 Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
12 Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1950).
13 Islom v. California Junior Republic, 33 Cal. App. 2d 299, 91 P.2d 121 (1939).
14 Silva v. Providence Hospital, 97 P.2d 798 (Cal. 1939).
15 Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 167 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1946).
16 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
17 Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanitarium v. Wilson, 51 Ariz. 424, 77 P.2d 458
(1938).
18 Roman Catholic Church v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P.2d 455 (1952), aff'd. on re-
hearing 74 Ariz. 76, 244 P.2d 351 (1952).
19 Moats v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 13 Alaska 546 (1952).
20 Tuengel v. City of Sitka, 118 F. Supp. 399 (D.C. Alaska 1954).
21 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Municipal Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P.2d 765
(1953).
22 Davin v. Kansas Medical Missionary and Benevolent Association, 103 Kan. 48, 172 Pac.
1002 (1918).
23 Webb v. Wright, 127 Kan. 799, 275 Pac. 170 (1929); see also Leeper v. Salvation
Army, 158 Kan. 396, 147 P.2d 702 (1944).
24 Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
25 Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P.2d 849 (1938).
26 Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 63, 297 P.2d 1042 (1956).
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New York was thought to have rejected the immunity doctrine,2 7 until its Court
of Appeals introduced the artificial distinction between administrative and profes-
sional duties in considering the applicability of respondeat superior to charitable
institutions.28 However, in 1957 the doctrine of charitable immunity was completely
rejected in New York.2 1
A 1950 decision in Illinois held that a charity is liable to suit, but judgment can
not be levied against charitable trust property.2 0 There is some dispute as to whether
a cause of action is stated where it is not alleged that there are non-charitable assets.2 '
However, a 1959 decision abolished tort immunity as regards school districts. 2 The
court analogized charitable immunity to governmental immunity, and criticized
Moore v. Moyle3 for allowing a charitable institution to determine its own liability.
This indicates the doctrine may soon be overruled in Illinois.
Kentucky's long-standing rule of full immunity34 was seriously impaired in a
1957 decision.32 The charity neglected to comply with a statute requiring a fire
escape on its income-producing property. The plaintiff was injured when she jumped
from the burning building. The court criticized the theoretical support for the
doctrine, while mentioning the availability of liability insurance to meet a growing
sense of social responsibility. Although the decision was limited to the facts involving
a statutory violation on income-producing property, in cases involving a stranger, the
indication is that Kentucky will abolish the doctrine at the first opportunity.
In Nevada immunity, limited to beneficiaries, was based on the waiver theory,30
and on New York and Michigan cases. In a 1955 case2 7 the court gave indications
that it might overrule immunity; the opinion spoke of modem concepts and the avail-
ability of insurance. However, it declared any repudiation should be prospective
rather than retroactive, and should come from the legislature. New York repudiated
charitable immunity in 1957,38 and Michigan adopted prospective repudiation this
year. If Nevada continues to follow its eastern and midwestern sister states, the possi-
bilities of repudiation are apparent.
The doctrine of full immunity has not been passively received in Pennsylvania of
late. 9 In 1951 three dissenting justices, although agreeing with the majority that any
change should come from the legislature, sought to make an exception where the
injury resulted from a statutory violation. A federal court,40 six years later, speculated
that Pennsylvania, often influenced by New York decisions, might adopt the Bing
case41 ; this conjecture was shared by a persuasive minority in a 1958 Pennsylvania
case.4 2 The majority opinion mentioned the availability of liability insurance but said
immunity should be abrogated only by a prospective statute, if at all. In an extensive
dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Musmanno pointed out the inconsistencies of the rule.
He charged that the majority was avoiding action by a request to the legislature to
remove a court-made rule; the opinion indicates that the majority shared his dislike
of the doctrine. In view of opinions of the two dissenting justices, and the recent
27 Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937).
28 Cadicamo v. Long Island College Hospital, 308 N.Y. 196, 124 N.E.2d 279 (1954).
29 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 312, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
30 Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
31 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89
(1959), aff'd 362 U.S. 968 (1959).
32 Slinker v. Gordon, 344 Ill. App. 1, 100 N.E.2d 354 (1951).
33 405 Ill. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
34 Emery v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S.W. 577 (1921).
35 Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese of Louisville, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957).
36 Bruce v. Y.M.C.A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929).
37 Springer v. Federated Church of Reno, 71 Nev. 177, 283 P.2d 1071 (1955).
38 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 312, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
39 See, e.g., Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
40 Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1957).
41 Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 312, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
42 Knecht v. St. Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958).
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prospective repudiation by the Michigan court, it is possible Pennsylvania will over-
rule previous decisions.
The Oregon doctrine of full immunity came under close scrutiny in 1955. 4 3 The
majority indicated its doubts by saying "what a divided court decides today may be
changed tomorrow ... ." The majority reason for not agreeing with the compre-
hensive, convincing dissent was stated to be that the legislature should declare public
policy, an insubstantial consideration in view of the fact that the court apparently
declared the immunity in the first place. The reason for the decision was probably
the court's expressed concern for charities which have relied on the law. Considering
the effective dissent and the prospective ruling by the Michigan Supreme Court, it is
possible one judge may change his mind in the next test.
Arkansas has echoed the courts of Oregon, Nevada, and Pennsylvania in de-
claring that any change in the doctrine of full immunity should come from the
legislature.44 This ruling followed criticism and disapproval of an earlier case invok-
ing the doctrine.4 5
In at least two instances in which charitable immunity was nullified, subsequent
action has revived it. An Ohio decision relied upon the availability of liability
insurance in holding a charitable hospital liable in 1956.48 Subsequent lower court
decisions have held this rule applied only to hospitals, and not to religious
institutions.47 The earlier doctrine of qualified immunity was applied; one de-
cision49 indicated the availabilty of liability insurance to charities was a poor reason
for making them liable. In a practical vein, it suggested that each individual re-
cipient insure himself against the negligence of the charity. Since the Ohio Supreme
Court has not ruled on the immunity of a religious charitable institution since the
1956 decision, there is a fair inference that the court will decide the issue in favor
of charitable liability when next faced with the question.
In three 1958 cases New Jersey overruled its earlier doctrine of qualified im-
munity.50 The legislature subsequently passed a statute absolving charities in general
from liability, but making hospitals liable up to $10,000.51 This law expired by its
own terms on June 30, 1959. On June 11, 1959 the legislature passed substantially
the same statute without a terminating provision.
52
Other states with legislation affecting immunity are Rhode Island and Mary-
land. A 1938 statute"5 gives charitable hospitals in Rhode Island full immunity.
Maryland passed a statute in 195 1 limiting the full immunity enjoyed by
charities.55 Maryland courts interpret it as estopping eleemosynary institutions from
pleading immunity, at least up to the amount they are covered by insurance.5
The immunity doctrine continues to find support. A 1960 Florida decision5
limited an earlier opinion that might have served to repudiate the doctrine.58 It is
43 Landgraver v. Emmanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955).
44 Cabbiness v. City of North Little Rock, 228 Ark. 356, 307 S.W.2d 529 (1957).
45 Arkansas Valley Cooperative Rural Electric v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 14 S.W.2d 538(1940).
46 Avellone v. St. Johns Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
47 Tomasello v. Hovan, 6 Ohio App. 2d 508, 155 N.E.2d 82 (1958).
48 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Association, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
49 Rosen v. Concordia Evangelical Lutheran Church, 167 N.E.2d 671 (C.A. Ohio 1960).
50 Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958); Callopsy v.
Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27
N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958).
51 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1-53 (1958).
52 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-78 (1959).
53 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 95 (1938).
54 MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 85 (1951).
55 See Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A.2d 574 (1948).
56 Gorman v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 20 Md. 1, 121 A.2d 812 (1956).
57 Smith v. Duval City Welfare Board, 118 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1960).
58 Suwanee County Hospital Corp. v. Golden, 56 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1952).
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found or suggested in varying form in 17 other states.i9 In some instances there have
been no recent test cases.
60
The changing nature of social thought will probably curtail the immunity
doctrine further. Many people are covered by hospitalization insurance today;
charities are often extremely large and wealthy; the need to encourage charities
diminishes as government moves into formerly charitable enterprises; most charitable
budgets could with ease allocate funds for insurance, as compared to the often large
individual loss from tort. These reasons, and others, will persuade more courts, as
they have persuaded the Michigan court, to decide for injured individual plaintiffs-
regardless of the ideological motives behind the enterprise which is tortfeasor.
Richard C. Wilbur
TORTS - PRENATAL INJURY - CHILD BORN ALIVE MAY RECOVER FOR INJURIES
SUSTAINED WHILE EN VENTRE SA MERE IF VIABLE AT TIME OF INJURY. - Plain-
tiff, as administratrix of deceased child's estate, appealed from an order of the
Superior Court sustaining the defendant's demurrer to her amended declaration
in which it is alleged that, while her intestate was an existing, viable' child in his
mother's womb, he received bodily injury in a collision of automobiles, "causing
him to be born prematurely, and which said bodily injuries resulted in his death."
The Supreme Judicial Court held: remanded. Plaintiff should have had an oppor-
tunity to amend her declaration to allege with sufficient certainty the fact that the
child was born alive. A child or his legal representative may recover for injuries
sustained during gestation if viable at the time of injury and if born alive. Keyes
v. Construction Service, 165 N.E.2d 912 (Mass. 1960).
The immediate significance of this case lies in the strict limitation which it
places upon Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,2 a bedrock Massachusetts
case which made a profound impact upon the early American development of the
law of prenatal injury. Handed down by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court through Justice Holmes in 1884, Dietrich evidently was the first American
or English case on the question and it was quickly adopted by the majority of
American courts deciding liability for prenatal injury.
Two basic reasons for denying recovery were advanced in Dietrich: (1) that
59 E.g., Indiana: St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537 (1924);
Missouri: Kruger v. Schmiechen, 364 Mo. 568, 264 S.W.2d 311 (1954), although some prog-
ress is indicated in Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275
S.W.2d 344 (1955); Nebraska: Wright v. Salvation Army, 125 Neb. 216, 249 N.W. 549
(1933), and Parks v. Holy Angels Church, 160 Neb. 299, 70 N.W.2d 97 (1955); Georgia:
Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 143 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918), and Hospital Authority of
Marietta v. Misfeldt, 99 Ga. App. 702, 109 S.E.2d 816 (1959); Louisiana: Lusk v. U.S. F.&G.
Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941); Massachusetts: Carpenter v. Y.M.C.A., 324 Mass. 365, 86
N.E.2d 634 (1949); North Carolina: Williams v. Union County Hospital, 234 N.C. 536, 67
N.E.2d 662 (1951); South Carolina: Caughman v. Columbia Y.M.C.A., 212 S.C. 327, 47
S.E.2d 788 (1949) ; Tennessee: Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S.W.2d 401 (1943) ;
Texas: Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1951); Virginia:
Norfolk Protestant Hospital v. Plunkett, 162 S.E. 363 (1934); West Virginia: Meade v. St.
Francis Hospital of Charleston, 137 W.Va. 834, 74 S.E.2d 405 (1953); Wisconsin: Shan v.
Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N.W.2d 212 (1942); Connecticut: Durant v. Grace New Haven
Community Hospital, 20 Conn. Supp. 19, 119 A.2d 743 (1955); Colorado: St. Luke's Hospital
Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
60 E.g., Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Ad. 898 (1910);
Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
1 "Capable of living, said of a foetus that can live outside of the uterus." MALOY,
MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 567 (2d ed. 1951).
2 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884). In this case, a woman slipped on a defect
in a highway when she was between four and five months advanced in pregnancy. The
fall brought on a miscarriage. There was testimony that there had been motion in the child's
limbs for ten or fifteen minutes.
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there was a lack of authority for allowing such an action and (2) that an unborn
child is merely a part of its mother and, therefore, has no distinct juridical existence.
Early cases following the Dietrich rule added reasons. These actions arose either
as personal injury actions, whether the infant had been injured in utero, had been
born alive, and survived bearing permanent injuries as a result of the tortious act,
or as wrongful death actions. It was asserted that proof of a causal relation be-
tween prenatal injury and the death or resulting condition of the child depends
upon speculation and conjecture and that a flood of fictitious claims would be
the consequence of recovery.3 Other cases relied on stare decisis4 and maintained
that, since there was no common law right of action, the establishment of such a
cause of action was a function of the legislature.5 A famous Irish case approached
the question under a theory of contract, holding that a common carrier owes no
duty to an unborn child since it has not contracted to carry him as a passenger.,
It was also asserted that, if such an action were allowed, it would follow that the
child might bring suit against its mother for negligence while carrying him during
pregnancy.7
Although this attitude prevailed until 1949, it was a development which had
not taken place without objection. In Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital," a foetus in
its ninth month of uterine development was injured and had survived; the "viability
theory" was set forth in a dissenting opinion now regarded as the classic exposition
on this approach. Justice Boggs there rejected the fundamental theoretical argu-
ment for denying recovery, that the unborn child was a part of the mother, had
no distinct existence or being, and, therefore, was not a person recognized by the
law as capable of having standing in court. He maintained that, if the foetus has
reached the viable stage, the law should take cognizance of the fact that the injury
was incurred by a distinct human entity.9 His opinion prompted legal writers to
criticize the injustice of the prevailing rule.10
3 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935);
Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
4 Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Drobner v. Peters, 232
N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) (in which Cardozo, J., dissented, but without opinion);
Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916); Gorman
v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901).
5 Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Newman v. City of Detroit,
281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900).
6 Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891). See also, Nugent v.
Brooklyn Heights R.R. Co., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913), appeal dismissed,
209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E. 1107 (1913).
7 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
8 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
9 Id. at 56 N.E. 641:
[B]ut if, while in the womb, it (the unborn child) reaches the prenatal
age of viability when the destruction of the mother does not necessarily end
its existence also, and when, if separated prematurely, and by artificial
means, from the mother, it would be so far a matured human being as
that it would live and grow, mentally and physically, as other children
generally, it is but to deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life,
and that the life of the mother. Medical science and skill and experience
have demonstrated that at a period of gestation in advance of the period
of parturition the foetus is capable of independent and separate life, and
that, though within the body of the mother, it is not merely a part of
her body, for her body may die in all of its parts and the child remain
alive, and capable of maintaining life, when separated from the dead body
of the mother. If at that period a child so advanced is injured in its
limbs or members, and is born into the living world suffering from the
effects of the injury, is it not sacrificing truth to a mere theoretical ab-
straction to say the injury was not to the child, but wholly to the mother?
(Emphasis added).
See also, Brogan, C.J. dissenting in Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942).
10 See 4 TORONTO L.J. 278 (1942); 12 ST. Louis L. RaV. 85 (1927); 61 CENT. L.J.
364 (1905); 58 CENT. L.J. 143 (1904).
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The right to bring an action for prenatal injuries was granted for the first
time by an American court of ultimate appeal, without the aid of a statute ex-
pressly recognizing the unborn child as a "person," 11 in a 1949 Ohio decision, 12
though recovery had been allowed earlier under the Louisiana civil law and by
statute.13 This marked the beginning of a trend.14 The viability theory so force-
fully submitted by the minority opinion of Justice Boggs became the majority rule.
Many courts, in adopting the new approach, sought to justify it by showing it to
be in accord with the accepted medical view,'3 by analogizing to other areas of the
law where the child is recognized as being in existence, 16 and by distinguishing
Dietrich, the long-time thorn in their side, on its facts.' This overcame the argu-
ment that there was but one person or being in existence -that of the mother. If
a child is born bearing physical defects which can be proved to have been caused
by another's negligence while the child is in its mother's womb, it is not realistic
to assert that the injury was incurred by the mother alone and not by the child.
With regard to one of the original arguments that there was a lack of prece-
dent for allowing recovery for an injury to a child in utero, it has been pointed
out that such a right should be recognized as part of the broad, fundamental com-
mon law principle that there should be a remedy for every wrong.'8 A broader
basis for compensating a child for injuries sustained while in utero has been that
natural justice requires it since, if the right of action were denied, "it (the child)
will be compelled, without any fault on its part, to go through life carrying the
seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and incon-
venience without any compensation therefor." 19
The most troublesome practical consideration is the inherent difficulty of
proof of a causal connection between the negligent act and the injury. Justice
Desmond in Woods v. Lancet answered this by saying:
But such difficulty of proof of finding is not special to this particular
11 Recovery had been previously allowed, however, in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp.
138 (D.D.C. 1946). See also an earlier opinion by the Canadian Supreme Court: Montreal
Tramways v. Leveille, 4 Dom. L.R. 337 (1933).
12 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
13 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. 1923) (civil law); Scott v. McPheeters, 33
Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939); rehearing denied, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 94 P.2d 562
(1939) (statutory provision).
14 Professor Prosser comments: "The reversal is so definite and marked as to leave
no doubt that this will be the law of the future in the United States." PRossER, ToRTs 176
(2d ed. 1955). It is significant that some of the cases most heavily relied upon by the
courts, which in the past denied recovery, have been overruled. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J.
353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (overruling Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489
[1942]); Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955)
(refusing to follow Squillo v. City of New Haven, 14 Conn. Sup. 500 [1947]); Steggall v.
Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 358 S.W.2d 577 (1953) (overruling Buel v. United Rys. Co. of St.
Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 [1913]) ; Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953)
(overruling Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 [1900]); Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951) [overruling Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E.
567 (1921)]. In La Blue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960) and Puh v.
Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 243, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), the Supreme Courts of
Michigan and Wisconsin have both apparently abandoned their previous holdings denying
recovery in Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937), and Lipps v.
Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
15 Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); Demasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197
Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.
2d 334 (1949); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
16 See Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951), for an extensive
review of authority taken from the fields of criminal, property, civil, and admiralty law which
consider an unborn child as being a "person."
17 "A distinction frequently drawn is that the unborn child in the Dietrich case had not
attained a state of viability, whereas the unborn children in recent cases sustaining a right of
action were viable when injured." Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417 (1953).
18 Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
19 Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 Dom. L.R. 337 (1933).
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kind of lawsuit. . . Every day in all our trial courts (and before adminis-
trative tribunals, particularly the Workmen's Compensation Board), such
issues are disposed of, and it is an inadmissible concept that uncertainty
of proof can destroy a legal right. The questions of causation, reasonable
certainty, etc., which will arise in these cases are no different, in kind,
from the ones which have arisen in thousands of other negligence cases
decided in this State in the past.2 0
It is to be recognized that the cases present an imposing safeguard against fraudu-
lent claims. The burden of proving the fact of causation rests with the plaintiff
and he must establish it to the satisfaction of the jury in order to be recompensed.
Furthermore, courts constantly have to deal with the problem of exposing and dis-
missing fraudulent claims, and, assisted by the advancements in medical science, are
able to overcome much of the difficulty. But the right to bring an action is some-
thing quite apart from the ability to sustain it.
2
'
In subsequent cases in Massachusetts involving injuries to viable foetuses born
alive, despite the cases in other jurisdictions finding a determinant factual distinc-
tion in Dietrich, the Massachusetts court felt obliged to follow its own holding,
particularly while the Dietrich rule was still supported by the majority of other
jurisdictions. 22 In Keyes v. Construction Service, the court has re-examined the
question, acceding to the preponderance of decisions allowing recovery in the past
decade and the progress in medical knowledge. The court stated all of the reasons
both for denying as well as for allowing recovery, which have been explored above.
It concluded that it is more important that its ruling "be right, in light of later
examination of authorities, wider and more thorough discussion and reflection upon
the policy of the law," than that it merely bow to precedent. It has, by its decision,
brought Massachusetts in line with what is now the majority view in the United
States.
The court in Keyes found no need to overrule the Dietrich decision, but merely
limited its application to cases factually similar, i.e., where the foetus was injured
while non-viable or where it was stillborn. The effect, therefore, seems to be that
the death-blow has been rendered to the general rule that there is no cause of
action by or for an infant for prenatal injuries.
While it may now be stated safely that, in cases involving viable infants born
alive, the right of recovery for prenatal injuries is firmly established, there are
other important aspects of this problem which warrant consideration. One of these
aspects is the limitation of the viability theory and the adoption of a rule by which
a cause of action is vested in a child injured while non-viable and subsequently
born alive. It is urged that the viability distinction, though neither logically nor
medically justified, is historically explainable by the well-known and "understand-
able conservatism" of the courts which initially repudiated the Dietrich rule by
adopting the approach of Justice Boggs. 23 It is highly significant to note that all
of the cases mentioned above which allowed recovery involved injury to the child
when it had reached viability and the courts had no reason for extending their
holdings beyond the case before them. However, it must be conceded that some
expressly limited their holding to the viability situation.
The viability rule is not capable of practical application in many instances
since there is no arbitrary moment of time at which it may be said that all foetuses
20 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1953).
21 E.g., Puhl v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 243, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959)(insufficient evidence).
22 Cavanaugh v. First Natl. Stores, 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952); Bliss v. Pas-
sanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950). In Bliss, that the Massachusetts court was weak-
ening in its feeling on this question can be seen by the following statement (at 207):
We readily concede the strength of these grounds (urging recovery),
but there is also strength in the arguments to the contrary.... We do not
intimate what our decision would be if the question were presented for the
first time. (Emphasis added).
23 Smith v. Brennan, supra note 18.
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become viable.24 Unless the child is born prematurely and, in fact, does survive,
it cannot be determined at what point it attained viability. According to the "bio-
logical theory," legal separability begins when there is biological separability; and
it is now recognized by medical authority that there is a separate living human
organism from the moment of conception.'s This view that the distinction between
non-viability and viability is not warranted has been advanced by a growing num-
ber of legal writers.2 6
Reference to other areas of the law where the child is recognized legally to
be in existence while in utero has been extensively used by courts going no further
than the viability theory. However, this argument is equally applicable to cases
of non-viability, since civil law, admiralty law, criminal law, and the law of property
consider the unborn child a distinct entity from the moment of conception.Y If
these courts have seen fit to rely on this reasoning, it seems to follow necessarily
that they will be required to accept the biological theory as the logical extension
of this argument. If the child is born with serious impairment, which can be shown
to have been directly caused by the defendant's negligence, it is not valid to make
the distinction between viability and non-viability the test of a right to recover-
the end result is the same in either instance and that is what must be recognized
as the controlling factor. Though the problem of proof increases as injury occurs
earlier in gestation, this is relevant only insofar as it affects the plaintiff's ability
to establish his case.
The remaining aspect of the problem concerns the child injured during gesta-
tion, as a result of which he is born dead. The action is brought under a wrongful
death statute; the issue is whether the unborn child is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the statute.28 Logically, since most courts now recognize that the unborn
child is a living human being, it would follow that there is a cause of action if its
death is caused by the tortious act of another. If it is living, the cessation of that
state is death, and such statutes were designed to allow recovery by the deceased's
personal representative for wrongful death.
Of those courts allowing recovery for the loss of a stillborn, all involved
injuries to foetuses which had reached the viable stage and so were deemed to be
"persons" because of their capacity to exist, at that time, independently of the
mother.29 An equal number of cases, however, have refused to recognize a right
24 Viability is a relative matter and is not solely determined in each instance by age alone.
Greenhill, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 391, 794 (10th ed. 1951).
25 Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). The court pointed out
at 697:
The mother's biological contribution from conception on is nourishment
and protection; but the foetus has become a separate organism and remains
so throughout its life. That it may not live if its protection and nourishment
are cut off earlier than the viable stage of its development is not to destroy
its separability; it is rather to describe the conditions under which life will
not continue. Succeeding conditions exist, of course, that have the result at
every stage of its life, post-natal as well as pre-natal. (Emphasis added.)
Other cases allowing recovery for injury while foetus was non-viable are: Smith v. Brennan,
31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Bennet v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958);
Von Elbe v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C. 2d 635 (1958); Hornbuckle v. Planta-
tion Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Sinkler v. Knele, 29 U.S.L. WEEK
2159 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1960).
26 PROSSER, TORTS 175 (2d ed. 1955); 26 FoRD. L. Rlv. 684 (1958); 17 MD. L. REv.
90 (1957); 29 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1154 (1954); 50 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1952).
27 See, Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
28 Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 358 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss.
269, 72 So.2d 434 (1950).
29 Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H.
104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1951); Rainey v. Horn,
221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1950); Verkennes v. Corniea, 299 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838
(1949). But see, Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) (recovery allowed
when child is "quick").
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of action where a stillbirth is involved.30 A New York court held that, though there
are at least some facts available to aid in estimating damages as to the value of
the life of a child who died in infancy, there are "no elements whatever upon which
a jury could base any conclusion that a pecuniary injury had been suffered by the
plaintiff from the loss of an unborn child." 3 A section of the California statute3 2
expressly defining an unborn child as an existing person was qualified to be
applicable only "in the event of its (the child conceived) subsequent birth" and
led to a denial of recovery to a stillborn's representative.33
One is hard pressed to accept recovery on behalf of a child under a wrongful
death action where the injury and death of the foetus come early in the pregnancy.
Yet, it must be admitted that, in pursuing the logical extension of the biological
theory, recovery would be appropriate. In any event, it appears that courts will
continue to go beyond the viability theory in the near future, possibly limiting the
right of action by adopting the rule that a "conditional prospective liability is
created" when a foetus is wrongfully harmed by the act or omission of another
and that "liability attaches on fulfillment of an implied condition that the child
be born alive." '4 In this way, the status of an unborn child as a "legal person"
may be properly qualified.*
Raymond W. Brown
30 Hogan v. McDaniel 319 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1958); West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369,
105 S.E.2d 88 (1958); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil
Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951). It should be noted that the courts in the latter three
cases left the question open where the child was born alive and subsequently died.
31 In re Logan's Estate, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Surr. Ct. 1956); aff'd., 166 N.Y.S.2d 3,
144 N.E.2d 644 (1957).
32 CAL. CIv. CODE § 29:
A child conceived but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person,
so far as may be necessary for its interest in the event of its subsequent
birth.
33 Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954).
34 Keyes v. Construction Service, 165 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1960).
* A Federal court in South Carolina awarded a three-year-old child $260,000 damages Oct.
8, 1960, for brain injuries arising from an automobile accident which occurred three months
before the child was born. The United States was defendant in the action. The South Bend
Tribune, Oct. 9, 1960, p. 2, col. 1. (Ed.)
